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Abstract
Recently, Elio Conte has commented a paper by the present author devoted to
analyze the possibility of checking experimentally whether the perceptual process
can lead to the collapse of the wavefunction. Here we answer to the comments by
Conte and we show that he has missed to grasp the crucial elements of our proposal.
Morever, we discuss some ideas put forward by Conte concerning the occurrence of
quantum superpositions of different states of consciousness and we show that they
are rather vague and not cogent.
1 Introduction
We have read with interest the paper [1] by Elio Conte: Answer to GianCarlo Ghirardi
in which he discusses some experiments which are relevant for Perceptive and Cognitive
Sciences. Here, we will reply to his remarks on our paper [2] and we will analyze critically
various other arguments presented by him.
The most relevant fact, for what concerns our contribution, is that in ref.[1] our po-
sition has been to a large extent misunderstood. In fact, the question we have tackled is
whether the perceptual apparatus is able to induce the suppression of linear super-
positions of states each of which is associated to a different perception and whether this
fact might be experimentally investigated. The aim is obvious, i.e. to account for our
definite perception even in the case in which the stimulus is generated by a microsystem
in a superposition of two states which, by themselves, would induce different perceptions.
On the contrary, ref.[1] addresses exclusively the quite interesting problem of whether
quantum superpositions of brain states associated to different perceptions
occur and its answer to this fundamental question seems to be a clear-cut YES. In a
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sense we are interested in opposite problems: we believe that the perceptive processes
should induce reduction of quantum superpositions and we have suggested a way to check
this experimentally, while the author is concentrated on the actual occurrence of states
corresponding to different perceptions and to experimental investigations on this matter.
The arguments which are used by Conte for deriving his conclusions concerning super-
positions of different perceptions seem to us rather vague and inconsistent. Accordingly,
we will devote part of this paper to discuss them in detail.
2 Conte’s position concerning our paper
According to ref.[1] the investigations on Quantum Cognition have put into evidence that
quantum mechanics plays a basic role during the perceptive and cognitive performances
in humans. This claim is based on the assertion that the author and other scientists1 have
reached decisive experimental evidence of the occurrence of quantum interference during
our perceptive-cognitive performances.
Let me start by considering some arguments which should support such crucial ex-
perimental evidence. After having reported our argument in pages 2 and 3 of the paper,
the author, to reply to our proposal which, I insist, aimed to understand whether the
perceptual process can lead to the collapse of the statevector, starts by stressing that the
binocular and biaural hearing rise interesting features and questions, ..., in particular at
the level of consciousness.
My first remark is that to make reference to the binocular vision, as if it would play any
role in our analysis, is fully inappropriate. We have considered perceptions corresponding
to a luminous spot from a space point A or to a luminous spot from a space point B,
A and B being at a macroscopic distance (many centimeters) from each other. Now, it
goes without saying that the perceptions the light comes from A or the light comes from
B are different and can very well be distinguished also by a person who has one of his eyes
closed or in some way screened from the source: one eye by itself is certainly sufficient to
trigger different perceptions in the two cases. Accordingly, invoking binocular vision is
totally irrelevant for the argument.
Before proceeding, we consider it useful to add a specific comment. In a debate like
the present one we definitely consider more appropriate to make reference, as we did in
our paper, to the preceptive process than to consciousness. In fact, the whole program
of reduction by consciousness championed by J. von Neumann and subsequently by E. P.
Wigner, has been abandoned by Wigner himself as lucidly stressed by M. Esfeld [3] in his
essay on Wigner’s view of Physical Reality in which one reads:
An analogous consideration applies to Wigners later change of mind. His idea
contains a viable option: If one considers it to be inappropriate to take recourse
to the mind or consciousness of an observer in the interpretation of quantum
mechanics and if one regards state reductions as objective physical events, it is
reasonable to envisage a modification of the Schro¨dinger dynamics. The aim
then is to achieve a more general dynamics that encompasses state reductions.
1For these researches we refer the reader to the rich bibliography of ref.[1].
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The most elaborate suggestion in this respect goes back to Ghirardi, Rimini
and Weber [4].
3 Discussing the arguments and the data of ref.[1]
The author proceeds by recalling that “we have recently produced some experiments ev-
idencing as brain entrainment using photo and audio stimulation is able to enhance the
activity of our ... nervous system...” 2.
At this point the author concentrates his attention on the problem of whether we can
see single photons, and he anticipates a positive answer to this question, even though, at
the end, he is compelled to take into account a number of photons practically equal to the
one used in our paper, i.e. 9-10, hitting the eye in a time interval smaller than 100ms. To
deal with this question the author appropriately analyzes the different behaviours of rods
and cones in the visual process and describes how they work differently in dependence of
the environment (illuminated or dark) in which the perceiving subject is situated. This
part as well as the description of scotopic vision is interesting and informative.
From my point of view the two facts that about 9 photons are actually required at
the receptors and that the rods must respond to single photons even when the subject is
not able to see such photons because they arrive too infrequently, are quite illuminating.
Actually, as already stated, the first remark makes clear why I have chosen such a number
of photons (which, and this is absolutely crucial, have to be prepared in a quantum
superposition). For what concerns the second fact I stress that the property of rods to
respond to single photons is commonly assumed by all quantum physicists. The most
clear example can be found in a paper[5] by S. Adler who discusses, with reference to
the collapse models recently introduced[4], the changes taking place in a rod due to the
absorption of a photon.
The author of ref.[1], calls attention also to another fact which undoubtedly has a
remarkable interest for people interested in perceptions, but which is not relevant for the
problem at hand. He reconsiders the binocular vision and points out that when a subject
is in a dark room and the experimental setup is arranged in such a way that the signal
reaches one and only one of his eyes, he is normally unaware concerning which eye has
actually seen the signal.
At this point, and with specific reference to the just mentioned fact, the author presents
what he considers the central result of his paper: in this condition we are forced to
acknowledge that there is a state of “consciousness” which corresponds to a coherent
superposition of seing the signal by the right eye and seeing the same signal by the left
eye.
In my opinion the statement “we are forced ...” is logically unfounded. But this is not
the whole story. The just depicted situation is absolutely peculiar: the stimulus should
2A remark. The author should be more specific about the states triggering the mentioned processes
and evidences by making clear, first of all, whether the stimulus is a quantum superposition of states
leading to different perceptions, or a state corresponding to a unique, definite perception. In fact, the
assumption that the initial state is a superposition represents the starting and basic point of our analysis
and, in our opinion, is of fundamental importance for our and his analysis.
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Figure 1: The famous image by E. Rubin
induce a quantum superposition of macroscopically different states of the perceptual ap-
paratus. But we have unique and unambiguous perceptions.
The previous analysis should have made clear that the statements of the author that
there is no need to perform sophisticated experiments as the one proposed by us does not
follow in any way whatsoever. Actually, as we are going to discuss in the next section,
the arguments of the author are vague and logically obscure, and, as pointed out from
the very beginning of this paper, they have nothing to do with what we have discussed
within a rigorous quantum framework.
4 The last part of the paper
Our critical remarks are strengthened by the conclusive part of ref.[1]. Here, the author
takes into account the case of the celebrated ambiguous figures which can be perceived
in different ways. The best known example is the one of the “profiles and cup” proposed
around 1915 by E. Rubin [6], which we present in Fig.1.
It is perfectly true (and well known) that one cannot perceive simultaneously the
two images and that under continuous exposition of the figure the interpretation often
oscillates back and forth. However, there is no reason to deduce from these facts, as
the author does, that one has to accept that at some point the consciousness leads to a
quantum superposition of the two modes. Once more the argument is very obscure.
In the situation under consideration we have a classical object, only one, which remains
identical to itself forever with the black profiles and the white cup. In no sense whatsoever
this situation can be claimed to correspond, actually, to the superposition of a page with
the profiles and one with the cup. To claim that the unicity of the image perceived at
any given time and the changing in time of our perception proves that superpositions (in
the precise quantum sense) of conscious states actually occur is something unjustified and
arbitrary.
In spite of this, let us accept tentatively that actually the perceptive status of the
subject is a quantum superposition and let us present now a rigorous critical analysis of
the problem by following the arguments of the author looking at them from a correct
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quantum perspective3.
The author considers the case in which test subjects look at a screen on which two
ambiguous figures, B and A, are projected, one after the other. The figures admit only
two possible interpretations, amounting, within the quantum context, to accept that
we are dealing with dichotomic quantum observables. B and A play the role of two
quantum (noncommuting) observables. For simplicity we will indicate as +1 and −1
their eigenvalues and as {|b = +〉, |b = −〉} and {|a = +〉, |a = −〉} the corresponding
eigenvectors. The author of ref.[1], even though it is not fully explicit on this point,
assumes that immediately after being exposed to figure B the subject “is” in the quantum
state:
|ψinitial >= [
√
p(B = +1)|b = +〉+ eiθ
√
p(B = −1)|b = −〉], (1)
where we have denoted as p(B = +1) and p(B = −1) the probabilities that the subsequent
perception of the ambiguous figure B corresponds to +1 or to −1, respectively. Any phase
factor in front of the whole state is obviously irrelevant.
At this point one of the two indicated perceptions emerges, which, within a quantum
framework, means that reduction takes place and leads either to the state |b = +〉 or to
the state |b = −〉 with the indicated probabilities.
And now comes the crucial question to which the author does not give an explicit
answer but, at the same time, makes very clear with his specifications, what he has in
mind. Actually he considers now the exposition of the subject to the second ambiguous
figure, and makes the following (rephrased to be completely general) statement4: Let us
admit now that the probability of the subjects’ choosing A=+1, if they are sure that the
first ambiguous figure means B = +1 is p(A = +1|B = +1) while the probability of their
choosing A=+1 if they are sure that the first figure means B=-1, is p(A = +1|B = −1).
If we stay strictly within a quantum context the above sentence means that, if the state
of the subject is the eigenstate |b = +〉 of B, then, looking at A, there is the probability
p(A = +1|B = +1) of perceiving A=+1, while if he is in the eigenstate |b = −〉, there is
a probability p(A = +1|B = −1) of having such a perception.
If one follows this line of thought within a quantum scenario one can easily evaluate
the probability p(A = +1) of getting the final perception A=+1. In fact, in the time
interval between observing the first and the second image one has a definite perception
concerning the first image, which obviously means that he ends up in the state |b = +〉
or |b = −〉 with the indicated probabilities. Thus, quantum-mechanically we end up with
a statistical mixture of subjects in the two indicated eigenstates. Since, in turn, when
one is in one of these states one has the conditional probabilities p(A = +1|B = +1) and
p(A = +1|B = −1) of getting the outcome A=+1 (which, incidentally means to assume
that |〈a = +|b = +〉|2 = p(A = +1|B = +1), and the analogous one for the other case),
following the quantum rules when dealing with a statistical mixture one ends up with the
3We will disregard the specific case considered at the beginning by the author, in which in the first
experiment there is equal probability of getting any of the two possible perceptions and in the second
there are probabilities sin2 α and sin2 β for the subsequent outcomes and we will pass immediately to the
general case discussed by the author in which such probabilities take general values.
4We make reference for the moment to the case in which after the second experiment the subject
perceives A = +1.
5
fact that p(A = +1) takes precisely the form that the author derives using the classical
Bayes theorem. It goes without saying that the same argument leads to the Bayes result
for p(A = −1).
In contradiction with his previous statement if they are sure that the first ambiguous
figure means B=+1 ..., which quantum mechanically can mean only if they are in the
eigenstate |b = +1〉, he considers that the state of the subject is still the one of Eq.(1).
Obviously it makes no sense, in such a state, to say that they are sure of ... . In spite
of this fact, let us take for granted that, after being exposed to the observation of the
ambiguous figure B the subjects are still in the state of Eq.(1). Then, to evaluate the
probability p(A = +1) of getting, after the second ambiguous image has been shown to
them the perception A=+1 is given by the modolus square of the scalar product of the
states |a = +〉 and |ψinitial〉. If one evaluates this quantity, one easily gets the result:
p(A = +1) = p(B = +1)p(A = +1|B = +1) + p(B = −1)p(A = +1|B = −1) +
2
√
p(A = +1)p(B = −1)p(A = +1|B = +1)p(A = +1|B = −1) cos θ(2)
which is precisely the equation that the author claims to follow from the assumption that
quantum superpositions occur into the brain.
The competent reader will have already grasped the reasons for which I can claim that
the arguments of ref.[1] are mistaken and not understandable. If one takes the statement if
they are sure that the first ambiguous figure means B = +1 and similar ones, as indicating
that reduction has taken place and thus the state must be an eigenstate of B then the
computation gives the classical result. On the contrary, if one assumes that after having
observed the first ambiguous figure the state of the subject is still the one of Eq.(1), then,
quantum mechanically, it makes no sense to claim that the subject is sure concerning his
first perception.
The conclusion of this section should be obvious: the arguments of ref.[1] referring to
ambiguous figures are contradictory. The experiments that the author cites repeatedly
as new and extremely relevant might be actually so, but they do not contribute in any
way whatsoever to clarify the problems of whether perceptual processes are classical or
quantum and of whether these processes play a precise role in the reduction process.
5 Conclusion
Summarizing, we stress once more that the paper cannot be considered in any sense an
answer to ref.[2] just because it addresses a quite different question than the one raised
by us. Moreover, all arguments which, in the author’s perspective, would “prove” that
quantum superpositions of conscious states actually occur, are contradictory and not
amenable to any known physical process and/or accepted theoretical framework.
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